



Identifying and Teaching against Misconceptions: Six Common Mistakes about the Supreme Court

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My colleagues in science and math tell me that discussing students' preconceptions and misconceptions is a typical part of the discourse about teaching in their fields. By contrast, I rarely hear social studies teachers talk about this—

perhaps because so much of the content in social studies is or could be contested and we therefore shy away from labeling students' ideas as “pre” or “mis” conceptions.¹

As a general rule, in my social studies courses I tend to focus on topics and issues that are controversial or—as I often argue—are taught as “settled” and really need some unsettling.² But I do not think that everything that should be taught in social studies is controversial. In fact, much of what I think students should learn is not controversial—just hard. Consequently, I have come to believe that it is important for teachers to think deeply about the kinds of understandings that students come in with, identify their conceptions, and then organize teaching purposely to develop the “pre” and correct “the mis.”

An institution that is commonly taught about in middle and high schools is the U.S. Supreme Court. Many people—adults and young people alike—hold misconceptions about how it works. Interestingly, however, this lack of knowledge does not stop people from having a generally positive opinion of the Court—especially relative to the other two branches of the federal government.³ Every so often, polling is done that asks people to name Supreme Court justices as well as other groups (e.g., the Three Stooges and the Seven Dwarfs). The findings are always embarrassing and a bit bizarre. Notably, an astonishingly large percentage of people in the United States know all three of the stooges' names (74 percent to be exact), and about 80 percent can name two of Snow White's dwarfs.

By comparison, 63 percent of Americans cannot name two Supreme Court justices.⁴ Clearly, we should not over-generalize—it may be that some people who cannot name justices actually know a lot about the Supreme Court. Conversely, knowing the name of a justice does not indicate that a person understands anything substantive about the Court. Yet it is my sense that most people are not informed about what the Supreme Court does—in part because the media typically pays little attention to the Court, except when a Supreme Court position falls vacant and a new justice has to be nominated and approved.⁵

For many teachers, then, it is likely that while most of their students may have vague ideas and feelings about the Court, they are not coming into the classroom with robust content knowledge. However, this does not mean that they do not have any conceptions about the Court and what it does, or should do. In my experience teaching high school students in a variety of venues, and listening to hundreds of middle and high school teachers talk about their understandings about the Court—and what their students tend to know and not know—I have encountered six key misconceptions that many people hold about the Court (and the Constitution) that need to be corrected, or at least contested.

1. THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES TO EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING

When I was teaching high school government, history, and law courses, it was not unusual for students to believe that virtually every person and organization with which they interacted had to “follow” the Constitution. Because many students thought the Supreme Court only heard cases that dealt with the Constitution, this mistaken belief often worked to corrupt their understanding of what the Court did. It was not unusual for me to hear students say that their parents had violated their Fourth Amendment rights when they searched their bedrooms; complain that a private organization limited their free expression rights when it enforced strict behavior rules for activities; or argue that employers were violating their rights under the Constitution when they told them what to wear to work.

This mistaken belief about the Constitution’s reach is a sign that the core concept of “state action” had not been formed. That is, in virtually all circumstances, the Constitution only applies to actions taken by a federal, state, or local government actor. But my students believed that any person or organization that “governed” them by exerting authority in their lives was analogous to the “state” and therefore had to follow the Constitution. For example, one of my students believed that his employers were violating workers’ Fourth Amendment rights when they searched employee lockers.

This was a clear signal that he held a misconception about the reach of the Constitution. If he had understood the concept of state action, he would have realized that because his employer was a private entity, not the government, it was under no obligation to adhere to the procedures required by the Fourth Amendment. I realized that for a variety of reasons, my students seemed to have one large concept labeled “rights” under which they thought everything fit—as opposed to a more variegated understanding of the multiple sources of rules and rights. I have since come to believe that many people, not just young people, do not know what state action is. Thus, a fundamental misconception needs to be corrected by explicitly teaching students about the limits of the Constitution’s reach, and particularly about the difference between state and non-state actions. This is a perfect topic for a concept formation lesson where students are provided with examples of constitutional cases that clearly illustrate state action (as well as non-examples) and asked to identify who is being accused of violating the Constitution (e.g., a prison warden, a public school board, or a city council).

2. THE LIBERATION GENERALIZATION

Another belief that many people hold is that the Court’s primary and most frequently enacted function is to liberate people from the heavy hand of a discriminatory majority.

Supreme Court scholar Michael Klarman traces this misconception to the Court's landmark decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*. Klarman explains,

*The conventional assessment of the Court's countermajoritarian capacity has been distorted, I believe, by a single decision—Brown. Because that ruling rescued us from our racist past, the conventional storyline runs, the Court plainly can and does play the role of heroic defender of minority rights from majoritarian oppression.*⁶

The Supreme Court is not so much an error-correcting court as a uniformity-producing institution.

I learned about the relationship between *Brown* and the formation of the “liberation generalization” when a very skillful and experienced teacher told me how learning about the contemporary Supreme Court worked to diminish her interest in teaching a course in American government. She had attended a professional development program where she was taught that the primary function of the Supreme Court is to ensure uniformity in the federal judiciary. Consequently, most of the cases the Court chooses to decide revolve around legal issues for which there was disagreement among the lower federal courts. This information was profoundly disturbing to this teacher. She exclaimed, “I grew up at the time of *Brown*—we revered the Court.” Because she interpreted the ruling in *Brown* as a particularly potent representation of the Court liberating people from racist policies that the “majority” had enacted, she had come to believe that this was what the Court typically did. While there is a robust debate about whether the purpose of the Court should be to provide individuals with protection against the majority, there is less controversy among scholars about whether the Court sees that as its role, or has in fact, actually done that on a consistent basis. This is not to suggest that there are no examples of the Court performing this function, just that this particular role of the Court may be more the exception rather than the rule.

Most recently, the Court's controversial decision in the 2003 gay rights case *Lawrence v. Texas* has been interpreted by some as a particularly powerful example of the Court's majority acting to liberate or defend a group that was targeted by legislation (e.g., the “majority”). In this case, the Court ruled that a Texas state law that criminalized homosexual sodomy violated the due process clause of the 14th amendment. But it is important to note that many of the opponents of the Court's decision in the case have challenged the very right of the Court to overturn majority decisions—especially if they are about topics that are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. Teaching to correct Teaching to correct students' misconception that the Court's primary role is to liberate people is challenging, because this is clearly one function of the Court—and when that function is performed, the cases are often very important, so they garner landmark status. Yet it is a misrepresentation to teach that this is the focus of the Court most of the time.

3. THE BELIEF IN ERROR CORRECTION

Another common misconception that many lay people hold is that the role of the Court—as the “highest court”—is to correct errors when lower courts have made mistakes. But in most cases, the fact that a federal or state court below made a decision that seems to

be erroneous is not, by itself, a major reason why the Court takes a case. Most students would be surprised to know that if the error is actually a dispute over the “true” facts, then the errors are solely in the domain of the trial courts and will be not corrected or even addressed by the appellate courts. This is not to suggest that the Court does not overturn lower court decisions on issues of law (in fact, about 75 percent of the cases the Court decides do overturn a decision from below), but that is not its primary function. The Supreme Court is not so much an error-correcting court as a uniformity-producing institution. To understand the significance of this distinction, it is important to understand how cases get to the Court in the first place. Virtually all the cases decided by the United States Supreme Court have been granted a writ of *certiorari*. *Certiorari* is a Latin word that means “to be informed of.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines a writ of *certiorari* as:

“An order by the appellate court to bring the case before them when the court has discretion on whether or not to hear an appeal.” The Court does not have to grant requests for writs of *certiorari*, and most of the petitions requesting one are denied. For example, in most years the Court receives about 7,500 petitions for *certiorari*, but they typically take only 75-85 cases.

The vast majority of cases the Court agrees to decide each year involve a question about which there is disagreement among the lower federal Courts of Appeals (this is called a “circuit conflict”).⁷ Supreme Court litigator Tom Goldstein analyzed the Court’s docket in one recent term and found that 80 percent of cases involved a circuit conflict.⁸ As a general rule of thumb, the conflict must be significant enough to deserve attention. There are many instances in which the Court does not hear a case even when there is a circuit conflict. But if a strong argument can be made that a case focuses on an important question for which there is currently a conflict among circuits, and there is a need for a uniform answer across the nation (such as what a part of the federal tax code means), then it is more likely that the Court will decide to hear the case than they would a case for which there was not a circuit conflict.

4. THE GIDEON EFFECT

In addition to addressing misconceptions about the kind of cases the Court typically decides, it is important to teach accurate information about who is more likely to get a case heard by the Court. Among the cases the Court has selected to hear, very few are *in forma pauperis*, or cases filed by people who cannot afford the filing fee. In recent terms, an average of only one-tenth of one percent of paupers’ petitions were granted review (8 cases out of 6,386 in 2002-2003), compared to an average of 4 percent of paid cases (83 cases out of 1,869 in 2002-2003), during the same terms. This is extremely important information because it illustrates how relatively rare it is for the Court to take a case filed by a person in prison, a common misperception sometimes referred to as the “Gideon effect,” after *Gideon v.*

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Wainwright, in which the petitioner, Clarence Earl Gideon, famously appealed to the Court with his handwritten petition. This case is commonly taught—as it should be—but if not put in the context of its rarity, the effect of the case will be to reinforce a misconception about what kinds of cases the Court typically considers, and why.

5. A RULING IS A “RIGHT” ANSWER

In addition to misconceptions about what kinds of cases the Court takes, and for what reasons, it appears that many people believe that when the Court decides a case, its members are identifying the “right” answer to a challenging question. As Justice Robert Jackson famously wrote, however, “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.” In an unusual statement, Jackson’s remark acknowledges that the Court makes mistakes. By definition, then, it seems logical that the Court’s rulings are supposed to be “right” answers. If they were not, how could the Court make mistakes? The Court often goes to great lengths to communicate this belief when it overturns its own precedents. In these decisions, the majority will often say that the Court got it wrong in the past, and this wrong must now be righted. But if that were really the case, then how do we explain the tendency of the Court to split on many hot-button cases, such as those that involve affirmative action, abortion, gay rights, or presidential-vote counting? Although most of the Court’s decisions are not split, in the cases involving matters that are especially divisive to the public, the Court often splits as well.

What makes the *Brown* decision so unusual is that it was the exception to this general rule—a divisive issue that the Court decided unanimously. When the Court wades into matters that deeply divide people in the United States, it is usually a solid bet that they involve questions for which there is lively dispute about what the correct answer should be. That is, there is a lively intellectual contest going on that involves scholars and the public about what is the right answer to a constitutional or legal question. Rather than being viewed as final arbiters in this intellectual debate, justices are better seen as participants in the debate—and what they rule is not “right,” just what a majority of the Court agree on at a particular time. Finality, not being right, is what the system is designed to produce. Today, we would not say that the Court’s decision in the *Dred Scott* case was “right,” but it was final from a legal standpoint, even though the social and political issue was an open wound. This does not mean that the Court’s decisions can be ignored, but its decisions can certainly be criticized— and indeed, this is an important productive part of public discourse in a democratic society. Teachers who adopt this latter view are more likely to ask students to evaluate whether they think the Court made the correct decision in a particular case, a pedagogical move that would go a long way toward correcting the misconception that what the Court rules is right simply because it emanated from the Court. In other words, Justice Jackson may have overstated his case (perhaps intentionally so) when he said the Court was infallible because it was final. A more accurate read of the Court’s role in the knowledge-production process (which is one way to characterize the sector that the Supreme Court is in) is to say that the Court is neither infallible nor final. Either of those options would be, by definition, antithetical to democratic notions of how the meaning of what is “right” comes to be constructed and reconstructed.

6. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE COURT: DISROBING THE BLIND JUSTICE METAPHOR

Another significant misconception that many people hold about the Court is that Court decisions are made without influence from the public—or specifically, from groups the public forms to influence policy, such as Planned Parenthood and Liberty Forum. This misconception is probably linked to the mistaken belief that the Court’s primary function is to serve in an anti-majoritarian role; if the Court is supposed to constantly “check” the majority, then it must not be susceptible to its views. However, even a cursory understanding of how interest groups influence the work of the Court indicates that the notion that the Court makes decisions without input from the public is false. The important influence that individuals and interest groups have on the Court’s thinking is not something that the Court hides; indeed, it openly admits and even references such influences. For example, it is fairly common knowledge that individuals and groups interested in the outcome of a case file *amicus* (or friend of the court) briefs, in which they are expected to provide important ideas and information they want the Court to consider when ruling on the case. The Court relies on these briefs, and it is clear that some of them are quite influential. Although an unusually large number of such briefs were filed in the two University of Michigan affirmative action cases (over 100), many of the justices asked questions that referred to one in particular—a brief supporting affirmative action filed by a group of former military academy superintendents and retired military officers. This brief was also referenced in the majority decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.

While many standard government textbooks mention that individuals and groups can file *amicus* briefs, few explain how deeply and broadly engaged many groups are in the work of the Court on a variety of levels. Interest groups routinely pay for or provide a party’s legal representation. In fact, they often “shop” for compelling cases that they think the Court will resolve in their favor. This has been a frequently used litigation tactic by groups of every persuasion. These same groups serve the reverse function—working to keep cases off the Court’s docket—by discouraging petitioners from going forward with an appeal (or in one recent example, encouraging a party to settle a case even after the Court had granted review).⁹

Not only are many interest groups deeply involved in the work of the Court, but some are involved in an inordinate number of the Court’s cases. In the term that just ended, the National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc. (the public policy law firm affiliated with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) filed 18 briefs in support of certiorari, 15 briefs on the merits, for a total of more than 25 percent of the Court’s cases.

When one high school teacher learned this at a recent professional development institute about the Supreme Court, she exclaimed, “But isn’t that just like lobbying—and aren’t the courts supposed to be independent?” This exclamation sparked a very interesting conversation about what the role of interest groups in the Court should be.¹⁰ What became clear to the teachers attending the event was that interest groups are much more involved with the Court than those teachers had previously believed—and they now needed to figure out how to communicate that to students.

THE EFFECT OF CORRECTING MISCONCEPTIONS

Teaching to correct students' misconceptions about the Supreme Court may seem like a form of myth busting. Some people might think that this will diminish students' respect for important government institutions. In fact, it is possible that teaching to correct students' misconceptions may cause students to be less likely to revere the Court. However, we should not fear this result. I think we should be more nervous about teaching students to revere institutions. After all, awe is the enemy of inquiry. Conversely, it is more important that people know how institutions, such as the Supreme Court, really work if they are to truly understand what influence it has on U.S. society. Correcting many of the misconceptions I have described could serve an important role in disentangling the damaging connection that is often made between reverence and engaged citizenship. For example, someone who understands that the Court's primary and most frequently enacted function is to create uniformity in the federal court system may be less likely to view the Court as a political savior. This can be a good thing if we want to encourage people to let their views be known in the policy-making process. I am not suggesting that the Supreme Court, as an institution, does not deserve respect—I think it does, even though, like most people, I disagree with some of its decisions. But true respect is much more powerful when it comes from a strong knowledge base that can only be built if we recognize misconceptions and teach in a very explicit way to correct or at least expose them.

I doubt that all students hold the misconceptions I have discussed, or that my list of misconceptions is complete. However, I have frequently encountered them in my experience teaching about the Court. In the past, I did not consistently and purposely plan instruction to target students' misconceptions and work to change them. Now, I intend to work toward that goal, because eliminating misconceptions about critically important institutions in our society is a step to building deep knowledge about how such institutions actually work—surely a more important goal than simply fostering reverence.

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¹ Thanks to Jeff Passe for this explanation of why there is a difference in the discourse about misconceptions in the science, math, and social studies teaching communities.

² For example, I have written a number of articles about how *Brown v. Board of Education* is taught, in which I argue that we need to teach the controversies of *Brown* and its aftermath and that we rarely do. See Diana Hess, "Moving beyond Celebration: Challenging Curricular Orthodoxy in the Teaching of *Brown* and its Legacies," *Teachers College Record* 107, no. 3 (2005): 2046-2067.

³ See PollingReport.com, <http://www.pollingreport.com/institute.htm>, for recent opinion poll data about the views that people in the United States have about the Supreme Court, especially relative to their opinions about Congress and the presidency.

⁴ Zogby International, July 28, 2006, <http://www.zogby.com/wf-AOL%20National.pdf>.

⁵ Of course, there are times when the Court receives quite a bit of attention; two recent notable examples are *Bush v. Gore*, and the decision in 2005 on eminent domain (*Kelo v. City of New London*).

⁶ Michael J. Klarman, “How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis,” *Journal of American History* 81, no. 1 (1994):81-118.

⁷ Go to <http://www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks> for a map showing the federal circuits.

⁸ Information received from Tom Goldstein via personal communications on September 5, 2006.

⁹ In 1997, the Court granted certiorari in an affirmative action case about whether race could be a factor in teacher lay-offs. Before the oral arguments, the school board agreed to a surprise out-of-court settlement that was funded by a consortium of civil rights groups who feared that the Court would rule against affirmative action.

¹⁰ This teacher was attending the Supreme Court Summer Institute sponsored by Street Law, Inc., and the Supreme Court Historical Society.