By the time the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had gathered in Philadelphia in 1787, the American people had been accustomed for more than one hundred and fifty years to having most of their affairs managed first within the colonies and then in independent states. It was not surprising that the Articles of Confederation, the initial constitutional system for “The United States of America,” affirmed in its first article the general “sovereignty, freedom and independence” of the states. Beyond historical precedence, the commitment to state sovereignty drew support from sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theorists such as Jean Jacques Rousseau who argued that the habits and virtues needed by a self-governing people can be cultivated only in small republics. In short, history and theory seemed to be on the side of a confederation of small American republics or states.

If the American people were inclined to favor state sovereignty, they also were interested in comfortable preservation—that is, in the enjoyment of both “safety and happiness,” to borrow from the Declaration of Independence. By the mid-1780s, it was clear to many Americans that state sovereignty created obstacles to comfortable preservation, not the least being the impediments to a smooth-functioning commercial system. Concerns about the effects on the country of competing fiscal and commercial policies in the different states led to the Annapolis Convention of 1786. While the delegates to this convention did not come up with a specific plan for fixing the commercial system, they petitioned the confederation congress to arrange for a constitutional convention that would reconsider the Articles of Confederation with the aim of improving interstate commerce.

James Madison, one of seven delegates chosen to represent Virginia at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, prepared a document on the history of confederacies during the months preceding the meeting. Events such as Shays’s Rebellion in Massachusetts and disputes over the commercial use of the Potomac River, along with his study of history, convinced him that a system based on state sovereignty was destined to fail. Madison worked with other members of the Virginia delegation on a plan for a basically national, rather than confederal, system of government. In addition to provisions for separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches, the “Virginia Plan” would have empowered Congress “to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.” The Virginia Plan proposed a national government that would be legally and functionally supreme over the states.

According to Madison, only a national system would be capable of protecting the fundamental interests and rights of the American people. Other delegates at the convention disagreed. Roger Sherman of Connecticut, for example, argued that “the objects of Union . . . were few” and that “the people are more happy [sic] in small than in large States.” Sherman was not alone in preferring a confederation of small republics to a national or unitary political system. Madison understood that he had to expose the weaknesses of the confederal model to save the Virginia Plan. Sherman helped him out on June 6 by conceding that some states were too small and, hence, subject to factious violence. Madison seized upon this argument. He responded that “faction & oppression” had “prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest” states, although less in the former than the latter.

The teaching for Madison was clear: large republics are more likely to provide “security for private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice,” than small republics. This argument hit home with the delegates. Madison convinced them that what they wanted most from government, that is, protection for rights or republican liberty, could
best be achieved in a national system. Small republics, he argued, were actually bad for republican liberty, being hotbeds of factious division and violence. He summed up his position bluntly: “The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests & parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not be likely at the same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of the minority; and in the 2d. place, that in case they shd. have such an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it.” Here was the outline of the famous defense of the large republic that appears in Madison's Federalist Paper No. 10.

In the end, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention settled on a plan that combined national and confederal elements. To quote Federalist Paper No. 39: the proposed system “in strictness” was “neither national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both.” Madison’s June 6 speech, however, insured that the new “compound” republic would have a national as opposed to a confederal tilt. This innovative governmental model, what came to be called the “federal” model, represented one of America’s great contributions to the science of politics according to Madison. The model’s national elements were evident not only in the creation of separate executive and judicial departments as well as proportional representation in the House of Representatives, but in the supremacy clause that affirmed that the Constitution as well as national laws enacted under its authority would constitute the supreme law of the land. The confederal elements appeared in the provision for equal state representation in the United States Senate (a feature especially desired by the small states) and state participation in the ratification of amendments. The addition of the 10th Amendment in 1791 provided added protection for state interests (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”).

The defenders of the confederal model continued their attacks on the new system during the ratification debates that followed the convention. Patrick Henry of Virginia, for example, accused the delegates to the Federal Convention of violating their authorization by proposing to establish a “consolidated” government based on the consent of the people, rather than the states. For Henry, the new constitutional system would endanger the rights and privileges of the people along with the “sovereignty” of the states. Richard Henry Lee, one of the Anti-Federalists, shared Henry’s fear that a large republic would not be hospitable to liberty and natural rights. Like many other opponents of the Constitution, Lee also argued that republican liberty can be preserved only by a virtuous citizenry and that only small republics are capable of nurturing civic and moral virtues.

The fact that the document that issued from the Federal Convention did not include a bill of rights seemed to lend support to the charge by Patrick Henry and others that the proposed governmental system would promote neither the happiness nor the liberty of the people. In fact, several delegates to the convention, including George Mason of Virginia and Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts, were sufficiently troubled by the absence of a bill of rights that they departed without adding their signatures to the document. Gerry also worried that the new government would not adequately represent the people and that its powers were not well defined. When it was clear that the opponents of the plan would not accept the argument that the framework set out by the delegates provided for a limited government of enumerated powers that would be incapable of emasculating natural rights and liberties, an agreement was reached during the ratification period to add amendments that would guarantee, among other things, freedom of speech and religion, trial by one’s peers, and protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The federal system or compound republic crafted by the Framers was an ingenious response to the demand for both effective or competent government on the one side, and rights-sensitive government on the other. The decision to divide power among (federalism) and within (checks and balances) several governments positioned the American people to enjoy the benefits of a large republic (e.g., strong defense against foreign encroachments, national system of commerce, etc.) while still retaining significant control over their day-to-day affairs within the states. The states, and not the national government, were entrusted with the “police powers,” that is, the
authority to protect the health, morals, safety and welfare of the people. It is worth noting that Madison was quite content to entrust the police powers to the states—he never desired that the United States have a unitary system of government.

Ratification of the Constitution in 1791 hardly put an end to the debate between the advocates of state sovereignty or small republicanism and the proponents of national sovereignty and the large republic. The concerns of James Madison and Patrick Henry, for example, are never far from the surface of contemporary debates about the power of the federal government to impose regulations on the states under the Constitution's commerce clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. There is considerable evidence, however, that the tension between these positions not only adds vitality to the constitutional system, but has been critically important to the advancement of both national security and equality in the enjoyment of fundamental rights. The federal arrangement that was crafted by the delegates at the Federal Convention of 1787 has long been recognized as one of the principal models of a modern democratic system of government.

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Suggestions for Further Reading